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SUMMARY

The Oslo Accords have provided Israel with
effective political cover to maintain a prolonged
occupation and undermine prospects for
Palestinian self-determination through a twostate solution. They have also enabled Israel to
externalise the political and financial costs of
its unlawful practices. Unless structural flaws
in the Oslo process are corrected, any new
talks brokered by the US seem sure to end in
failure once again.
Open-ended occupation is unacceptable.
European officials must speak out clearly
against Israeli efforts to entrench a reality
in which Israel systematically discriminates
against Palestinians and in favour of its settlers
European states have the power to influence
negative dynamics on the ground, and in the
negotiating room. If Europe truly believes
that preserving the possibility of a two-state
solution is a strategic and moral imperative,
it must rethink its approach to peacemaking.
Chiefly, it should invest greater political capital
to realign Israel’s incentives with the goal of
ending its violations of international law and
support sovereignty building for Palestinian
institutions instead of just capacity building.

In 2017, Palestinians and Israelis mark several milestones.
It is 100 years since Great Britain issued the Balfour
Declaration, which committed it to the establishment of
a Jewish national home in Palestine. It is 70 years since
the international community endorsed the United Nations
Partition Plan, the first in a series of international efforts
to achieve a two-state solution. It is 50 years since Israel
conquered and began its occupation of the West Bank
(including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip during the
Six Day War. And it is 30 years since the first Palestinian
intifada erupted, shattering the illusion that Israel could
maintain its military occupation without facing resistance.
These milestones highlight not only the grim durability of
the conflict, but also the ineffectiveness of international
efforts to help resolve it. For now, the two-state solution
remains the goal, but confidence has waned in the capacity
of the Middle East Peace Process, as configured by the Oslo
Accords, to deliver a peace agreement and end the conflict.
Ongoing diplomatic efforts by the United States may yet
be capable of relaunching negotiations between Israelis
and Palestinians. But in the absence of any effort to correct
structural flaws in the Oslo process, they seem sure to end in
failure once again.
The Oslo Accords, which were initially conceived as a
framework for conflict resolution and bilateral cooperation,
have, over almost 25 years, been transformed into a regime
of conflict management in which there are few constraints on
unilateral action by Israel. Successive Israeli governments
have exploited the Oslo Accords’ complex jurisdictional
scheme and numerous loopholes to minimise the transfer
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of territory and authority back to Palestinian institutions.
Instead they have been used as cover for the massive
expansion of Israel’s West Bank settlement enterprise.

Israel’s practice and policies” and has failed to “effectively
challenge the underlying basis for its continued occupation
of Palestinian territory”.1

The international community, ever fearful of darkening the
atmosphere around peace talks, has generally acquiesced
to the Oslo Accords’ muddying of international norms and
marginalisation of multilateral institutions. At the same
time, it has provided significant financial assistance, not
only to facilitate Palestinian state building, but also to help
redress the consequences of the occupation for Palestinians.
This dynamic, created by the Oslo Accords, has allowed
Israel to externalise the political and financial costs of its
occupation, and condemned Palestinians to a seemingly
endless state of external dependency. The Oslo Accords and
the process they triggered have thereby served to entrench
an occupation they were meant to end.

This report builds upon a companion legal memo by Dr
Valentina Azarova in an effort to identify how Europe can
better hold the line against Israeli efforts to: irrevocably
alter the political geography and demographic character
of the OPT; obscure the OPT’s legal status; and undermine
the potential for a two-state solution.2 To that end, Europe
must follow through with differentiation practices to ensure
that its actions and policies towards Israel are consistent
with its own domestic legal order.3 It will also need to more
boldly invest political capital to realign Israel’s incentives
with the goal of ending its violations of international
law and, more broadly, its occupation of the Palestinian
territory. In addition, the focus of Europe’s support for
Palestinian institutions should shift from capacity building
to sovereignty building and work towards re-legitimising
Palestinian governance structures.

Three dominant features are defining the emerging reality
on the ground today:
1.

Israel’s annexation (de jure and de facto) of swathes
of West Bank territory

How the Oslo Accords entrenched Israel’s
occupation

2.

Israel’s imposition of a systematic discriminatory
regime across the occupied Palestinian territory
(OPT)

3.

The increasing fragmentation of Palestinians’
political and economic life owing in part to crippling
restrictions on movement in, and access to, their
own territory

For almost 25 years, the Middle East Peace Process
has revolved around the Oslo Accords – the series
of agreements concluded by Israel and the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO) between 1993 and 1999.
In several respects, the Accords have been a success.
They nudged both parties towards negotiation over
the “permanent status” issues that have fuelled the
Palestinian-Israeli conflict, they promoted and sustained
the vision of a two-state solution, and they helped
to contain successive rounds of violence. But the Oslo
Accords have failed to deliver on the core promises of
the peace process: delivering an end to the conflict and
ensuring Palestinian self-determination. Instead, the
framework for conflict management they established has
served to thoroughly entrench Israel’s occupation of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip.
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Although the situation may seem static, these features are
placing Palestinians and Israelis on a path towards openended conflict.
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The absence of a meaningful diplomatic process is reducing
the prospects for fulfilling a two-state solution and lending
weight to those on both sides who favour alternative strategies
and outcomes. A Palestinian civil rights-based strategy that
directly challenges the premises of Zionism as a movement
for Jewish self-determination may be what replaces the
current Oslo process. Or the new reality could be even more
unstable, characterised by ever more fragmentation of the
Palestinian national movement, increased extremism on
both sides, and cycles of intensified intercommunal violence
and state repression.
European states have the power to influence these
dynamics. But they have so far proved reluctant to use
the tools at their disposal to deter Israel from its unlawful
practices, or push Palestinian factions towards national
re-unification and re-democratisation. Europe may be
tempted to step back and only provide support from the
side-lines for renewed American diplomacy. But if Europe
truly believes that preserving the possibility of a two-state
solution is a strategic and moral imperative, it must rethink
the current peace-making model, which has “acquiesced to

A framework for unilateralism
The Oslo Accords gave birth to a transitional period that was
designed to last only five years. But more than two decades
later they continue to shape the reality on the ground and
international engagement in profound ways. The Accords
lessened Israel’s military presence in major Palestinian
population centres, paved the way for the return of the PLO
to the OPT, and allowed for limited self-governance through
the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority
1 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation: Consequences under
an integrated legal framework”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 2 June 2017,
available at http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/israels_unlawfully_prolonged_
occupation_7294. (hereafter, Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged
occupation”).
2 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”.
3 For more on differentiation and its application, see: Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s
unlawfully prolonged occupation”; Hugh Lovatt, “EU differentiation and the push for
peace in Israel-Palestine”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 31 October 2016,
available at http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/eu_differentiation_and_the_
push_for_peace_in_israel_palestine7163 (hereafter, Hugh Lovatt, “EU differentiation
and the push for peace in Israel-Palestine”.

(PA). In so doing, they helped to preserve the Palestinian
cause on the international stage and consolidated the
presence of Palestinian national institutions on the ground.
In addition, the numerous agreements comprising the
Accords set out detailed cooperative arrangements in a wide
range of fields – from security to civil affairs to resource
management – that continue to affect the everyday lives
of Palestinians. But what was conceived as a temporary
framework for bilateral cooperation pending a peace
agreement has morphed into an entrenched regime that has
done little to constrain unilateral action by Israel, providing
effective political cover for its creeping annexation, and
undermining prospects for Palestinian self-determination.4
Although the parties agreed that the arrangements they
established would be transitional, the Oslo Accords said
little about what the parties were making a transition to
and from. Israel did not acknowledge in the Oslo Accords
that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied territory,
though that had long been the view of its courts and the
entire international community. Nor did it explicitly
recognise the Palestinians’ right to self-determination or
statehood – limiting itself to an oblique acknowledgement
of the “legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.”5
The Accords’ vagueness regarding the ultimate outcome
of the process may have made it easier to commence
negotiations, but it made it much harder for the parties to
conclude them successfully, encouraging hard bargaining
and allowing back-sliding when new governments came
to power. Having committed to relatively little up front,
successive Israeli governments have attempted to: dilute the
terms of reference for negotiations; encourage international
submission to the realities Israel has unlawfully created in
the OPT; and force Palestinian concessions – all without
having to move, in any meaningful way, towards deoccupation on the ground.
Three key features of the Accords enabled Israel to act
unilaterally to deepen its occupation even while peace talks
were in progress. First, the Accords’ jurisdictional scheme
left Israel in full control of most of the West Bank during
the interim period – including many of the areas that Israeli
politicians and planners had long targeted for acquisition
on ideological or strategic grounds. Second, the Accords’
many ambiguous formulations – regarding, for instance,
how much territory would be transferred to Palestinian
jurisdiction, how many Palestinian prisoners would be
freed, and whether settlement activity would continue
during the interim period – gave Israeli leaders discretion
to interpret their commitments as broadly or narrowly as
they liked. Third, the Accords’ lack of a third-party dispute
resolution mechanism left the Palestinians with few avenues
4 As provided in Article 7 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, parties may conclude “special
agreements” defining arrangements during occupation in greater detail than those set out
in the Convention. However, in no circumstances may such agreements “adversely affect
the situation of protected persons, as defined by the present Convention, nor restrict the
rights which it confers upon them.”
5
“Article 3:3”, the Oslo Accords, 1993, available at http://cis.uchicago.edu/
oldsite/sites/cis.uchicago.edu/files/resources/CIS-090213-israelpalestine_381993DeclarationofPrinciples_OsloAccords.pdf.

for challenging bad faith interpretations of the agreements.
Although some Israelis pressed for scrupulous adherence
to both the letter and spirit of the Oslo Accords, these
three features of the agreements gave opponents of the
peace process manifold opportunities to limit and stall
implementation. Minimal territory and heavily restricted
powers were transferred to the PA’s jurisdiction, while Israel
steadily absorbed the areas that remained under its full
control through the accelerated construction of settlement
housing, roads, and other infrastructure.

Displacing and obfuscating international law
The Oslo Accords further contributed to entrenching
Israel’s occupation by marginalising international law as a
tool of conflict resolution and supplanting it with a system
that effectively formalised the inherent power imbalance
between the occupier and the occupied. Every change to
the ‘status quo’ had to be negotiated between the two sides,
with the Palestinians usually cast in the role of supplicant.
Even clear obligations under international law, such as the
prohibition of settlement activity and the requirement to
hold an occupied territory’s resources in trust for the local
population, were characterised as matters for negotiation
requiring compromise from the Palestinians.
In addition, Israel has used the Oslo Accords to obscure the
legal clarity with which international law views its status and
obligations as an occupying power, Palestinians’ right to selfdetermination, and the extent of third state responsibilities.
For instance, Israeli officials now argue that: “the term
‘occupied territories’ is a politically motivated term and does
not reflect a binding legal determination about the status of
the territory or the factual situation on the ground [created
by the Oslo Accords]”.6 Moreover, it has claimed that, since
the Oslo Accords did not transfer either civilian or security
authority over Area C – around 60 percent of the West Bank
– to the PA, ongoing settlement activity and displacement of
the local Palestinian population there is permitted.
A particular bugbear for the Israeli government has been
the provision of international humanitarian support and
development aid for vulnerable Palestinian communities in
Area C. Since 2009, at least 236 European Union-funded
structures have been demolished or seized by Israel. And,
according to the EU, a further 600 structures (worth
almost €2.4 million) are subject to orders for demolition,
eviction, or to stop ongoing work.7 Most recently, in June
2017, Israel destroyed and confiscated €40,000-worth of
equipment belonging to an electrification project sponsored
by the Dutch government in the Area C village of Jubbet
6 “Comments submitted by the Israeli Football Association (IFA) to the draft report
of the Chairman of the Monitoring Committee”, 24 April 2017. See also statements by
Israel’s deputy foreign minister Tzipi Hotovely that the term “occupation” is a distortion:
Raphael Ahren, “Israelis cry foul as UN leaders lament 50 years of ‘occupation’”, the Times
of Israel, 6 June 2017, available at http://www.timesofisrael.com/israelis-cry-foul-as-unleaders-lament-50-years-of-occupation/.
7 ECFR calculation based on data provided by Vice-President Federica Mogherini on
behalf of the European Commission and UN OCHA. See “UN OCHA Demolition Monthly
Report to the EU”, May 2017 (on file); and “Answer given by Vice-President Mogherini on
behalf of the Commission in response question from the European Parliament”, 9 August
2016, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E2016-005067&language=EN.
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Adh-Dhib.8 In each case the reason has ostensibly been
a lack of Israeli building permits, as the prime minister,
Binyamin Netanyahu, explained: “they’re building without
authorisation, against the accepted rules, and there’s a clear
attempt to create political realities there.”9
Pro-settler organisations have likewise built international
campaigns around such arguments, portraying the EU as
“acting illegally by funding unauthorised Palestinian building
in areas placed under Israeli control by international law”.10
This distortion of international law has created uncertainty
regarding the legal responsibilities of Israel and third states,
including among some members of the US Congress and
various parliaments in Europe. For example, there have
been repeated questions from members of the European
Parliament about whether EU funding for activities in Area
C is being carried out in violation of the Oslo Accords and
against the will of the State of Israel.11
The muddying of the legal waters has left many government
and private actors equally unsure of the extent of their
own responsibilities when dealing with settlement-linked
entities. In its ongoing deliberations on the contentious
issue of Israeli settlement teams, FIFA has, for example,
blamed repeated delays in resolving the matter on the
supposed lack of legal clarity relating to Israel’s exclusive
control over security and civil affairs in Area C.12
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While a full rebuttal of the historical, factual, and legal
revisionism of such arguments is beyond the scope of
this paper, it suffices to note that “the Accords neither
absolve Israel of its IHL [international humanitarian law]
obligations as an Occupying Power, nor constitute an act of
consent by Palestinian representatives to waive rights that
have been subsequently undermined by Israel’s violation of
international laws”.13

Marginalising multilateral institutions

The Oslo Accords could have avoided entrenching the
occupation had the international community been prepared
to hold Israel to account for violations of the agreements
and, more broadly, of international law. Instead, the
international community’s reticence gave Israeli leaders a
green light to determine the speed and scope of any move
towards de-occupation and to impose politically unpalatable
conditions on their Palestinian interlocutors when they
wanted to stymie peace talks.
Multilateral institutions like the UN General Assembly,
UN Security Council, UN Human Rights Council, and
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) have at times
undertaken to clarify the applicable legal framework and its
implications. The EU institutions have done so too, and have
been firm in explaining the applicability of international
humanitarian law and international human rights law to the
OPT. Palestinians too have sought recourse to international
mechanisms for accountability such as the International
Criminal Court (ICC) to uphold their legal rights and enforce
accountability over Israel’s unlawful actions.
All too often, however, it is third party governments
themselves that have disregarded – and in some cases
actively blocked – such processes. From the dawn of the Oslo
Accords until 2016, the United States vetoed four draft UN
Security Council resolutions censuring Israel for settlement
construction.14 American officials took the position that the
United Nations was an inappropriate forum for addressing
issues being negotiated by the two parties. Similarly,
attempts to convene parties to the Geneva Convention on
this topic were defeated or defused by governments anxious
to avoid poisoning the political atmosphere for negotiations.
Some EU member states have even attempted to dissuade
Palestine from joining the ICC and criticised UN Human
Rights Council resolutions focusing on Israel’s international
law violations. Most recently, the United Kingdom explained
its abstention from a UN Human Rights Council resolution
in March 2016 on Israel’s settlement activities arguing that
such a “disproportionate and biased” focus on Israel was
“hardening positions on both sides”.15

8 Amira Hass, “Dutch Protest Israeli Seizure of Palestinian Solar Panels They Funded
in West Bank”, Haaretz, 1 July 2017, available at http://www.haaretz.com/middle-eastnews/palestinians/.premium-1.798792.
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9 “Aid or political meddling? Israel, EU spar over Palestinian buildings”, the Times of
Israel, 8 April 2016, available at http://www.timesofisrael.com/aid-or-political-meddlingisrael-eu-spar-over-palestinian-buildings/.
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10 Jake Wallis Simons, “European Union is ‘breaking international law by funding illegal
West Bank building projects’”, the Daily Mail, 5 February 2015, available at http://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2874883/EU-funding-illegal-building-West-Bank-saysreport.html#ixzz4kXb0KHGW.
11 See, for example, question for written answer to the Commission by MEP Franz
Obermayr (ENF), E-006709-16, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getDoc.do?pubRef=-%2f%2fEP%2f%2fTEXT%2bWQ%2bE-2016-006709%2b0%2bDO
C%2bXML%2bV0%2f%2fEN&language=EN; and a similar question by MEP Petr Mach
(EFDD), E-007846/2016, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.
do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+WQ+E-2016-007846+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=pl.
12 For more, see Martin Konecny and Hugh Lovatt, “Why FIFA bottled out of enforcing
its own rules on Israel”, Middle East Eye, 23 May 2017, available at http://www.
middleeasteye.net/columns/fifa-has-three-options-deal-israeli-settlement-clubs-onlyone-legitimate-821972348.
13 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”.

14 See the Jewish Virtual Library’s list of draft UN Security Council resolutions critical of
Israel vetoed by the US, available at http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/u-s-vetoes-ofun-security-council-resolutions-critical-to-israel.
15 “Human Rights Council 34: UK explanation of voting on the resolution regarding
Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories”, gov.uk, 24 March 2017, available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/human-rights-council-34-ukexplanation-of-voting-on-the-resolution-regarding-israel-and-the-occupied-palestinianterritories.

Bankrolling Israel’s occupation
The Oslo Accords have entrenched the occupation by
creating a situation of moral hazard: even as Israel continues
to exercise control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the
PA relieves it of the burden of providing services to the
Palestinian population, while donors of international aid
relieve it of the costs of administering the territory.
This has turned the Palestinian territory into the largest
recipient per capita of international aid in the world,16 with
development assistance per person exceeding that of the
other top ten aid recipients combined.17 As the largest aid
donor to Palestinians, the EU alone has contributed €6
billion in bilateral cooperation assistance to Palestine since
1993,18 including the Palestinian Authority and various UN
agencies, among them, in particular, the United Nations
Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East (UNRWA).
International assistance has helped, of course, to provide
a modicum of stability – and at times critical sustenance –
to the Palestinian economy, and it has helped Palestinian
institutions to become “statehood ready”. But there is a limit
to what security sector reform and technocratic capacity
building can achieve in the fragmented and constrained
space created by Israel’s occupation.
In addition, international assistance creates a perverse
incentive structure in which donors absorb the costs of
Israel’s unlawful conduct but rarely take coordinated action
to challenge it – or even to characterise it as unlawful. Take,
for example, the response to Israel’s imposition of restrictions
on Palestinian movement, access, and trade. Even though
Israel committed in the Oslo Accords to facilitate “free
and normal” movement, in accordance with international
humanitarian law and international human rights law, and
even though Israeli restrictions are the leading impediment
to Palestinian private sector growth and cost the Palestinian
economy billions of euros each year, costs that are routinely
(if only partially) covered by international assistance. In
addition, international donor coordination mechanisms
such as the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee focus more on what
Palestinians should do than on Israeli obligations.19
The provision of international aid from the international
community has continued to be tightly linked to progress on
the diplomatic track. But as the proportion of humanitarian
aid has increased in relation to development assistance, and
prospects for bringing the conflict to an end have decreased,
16 Zinaida Miller, “Perils of Parity: Palestine’s Permanent Transition”, Cornell
International Law Journal, vol. 47, (2014), pp. 332-414.
17 Mikkel Bahl, “Verdens vildeste bistandseksperiment” [The world's wildest assistance
experiment], Udvikling, June/July 2012, p.10, available at http://ipaper.ipapercms.dk/
Udenrigsministeriet/Udvikling/2012/Udvikling32012/?Page=12.

international donors are finding themselves faced with a
dilemma. By cutting and reducing their aid to Palestinians,
donors would cause humanitarian suffering, undermine
the PA, and create instability in the OPT. Yet continuing
such practices without a clearly attainable political goal
eliminates any financial incentives for Israel to end its
occupation and reduces Israel’s stake in the success of the
Palestinian economy or political institutions.

The Israeli bubble
For many Israeli Jews, the status of the territories and the
Green Line itself have become increasingly obfuscated, with
62 percent no longer viewing the West Bank as occupied
territory.20 Yet a majority of Jewish Israelis still support
a two-state solution in principle, given the demographic
implications of absorbing an additional 4.4 million
Palestinians. Most – including among settlers – also reject a
one-state outcome for the same reason, because Israel may
be faced with the choice between being a democracy and a
Jewish state. These dilemmas, however, appear far removed
from the present.
If anything, Israelis feel that the “status quo” benefits them.
The Oslo Accords have created a situation that has insulated
Israelis from the negative consequences of prolonged
occupation: with a few exceptions, their security situation
has been stable since the end of second intifada, and they
have faced minimal costs in their international relations.
Indeed, the international and regional climate seems to
be shifting in Israel’s favour. Despite occasional hiccups,
Israel has continued to develop a process of normalising
relations with Sunni Arab states through back-channels and
is making diplomatic inroads in Africa and Asia.
Israel consequently feels little urgency to secure a twostate solution, and has little appetite for the sort of steps
that would be needed to bring one to fruition, whether
that relates to territorial withdrawal, a just settlement of
the Palestinian refugee problem, or the establishment of a
sovereign Palestinian capital in East Jerusalem. Nor have
Israelis so far been asked to choose between either a onestate or two-state outcome.
Without some sort of deus ex machina, it is difficult to
envisage the Israeli government stepping away from its
active promotion of settlement expansion, let alone taking
the measures necessary to achieve a two-state solution in
line with international expectations. As such, counting on
a self-induced moment of clarity in which Israel moves of
its own volition towards de-occupation and a real two-state
solution is a mistake. Instead, Israelis will continue to prefer
what looks to them like the least risky option − consolidation
of the current reality.

18 “Answer given by Mr Hahn on behalf of the Commission, in response question from the
European Parliament”, 7 March 2017, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2016-008996&language=EN.
19 Orhan Niksic, Nur Nasser Eddin, and Massimiliano Cali, “Area C and the Future of
the Palestinian Economy”, World Bank, 2014, available at http://documents.worldbank.
org/curated/en/257131468140639464/pdf/893700PUB0978100Box385270B00PUB
LIC0.pdf, p.3. (hereafter, Orhan Niksic et al, “Area C and the Future of the Palestinian
Economy”).

20 “62% of Jewish Public: Holding onto Territories in Judea, Samaria Not An
Occupation”, Israeli Democracy Institute, 4 June 2017, available at https://en.idi.org.il/
press-releases/15728.
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Annexing Palestinian territory
From the occupation’s very inception, Israeli leaders argued
that retention of large parts of the West Bank was a strategic
and ideological imperative. Influential policy blueprints
such as the Allon Plan and Sharon Plan were predicated
on the vision of ‘maximum land, minimum Arabs’, with a
view towards thwarting the creation of a Palestinian state.21
Although this vision was not unanimously shared among
Israel’s political and security establishment, it informed
decisions about where to erect civilian settlements. As
late prime minister Ariel Sharon candidly admitted in a
2001 interview, “it’s not by accident that the settlements
are located where they are,”22 their placement having been
intended to perpetuate Israeli control over the Jordan
Valley, the mountain aquifer, and other locations of military,
historical, or religious importance.
It is also no coincidence that Oslo’s complex jurisdictional
scheme so closely resembles these earlier blueprints
from the Israeli state. The Oslo Accords may have been
devised to allow Israel to keep its options open pending
the conclusion of peace talks, but, they have facilitated
Israel’s de facto annexation of West Bank territory (in
addition to the Jerusalem-area territory Israel has already
annexed de jure). Instead of transferring most of Area C to
Palestinian jurisdiction, as envisaged in the Oslo Accords,
Israel has retained full control over it. And in contravention
of international humanitarian law, it has continued to
appropriate resources there – water, stone, minerals – for
the use of its own population. It has restricted Palestinians’
access to and development of Area C, designating less than
1 percent of the territory for their use,23 and only rarely
granting building permits even within that 1 percent. And it
has sharply limited the access of the Gaza Strip’s 1.9 million
Palestinian residents to the West Bank in general, keeping
the population, which largely comprises refugees, boxed
into a tiny territorial enclave as Israel absorbs large swathes
of West Bank land.

July 2017

Israel’s settlement enterprise has also ramped up in recent
years. The West Bank settler population currently stands at
around 386,000 in Area C (and the Israeli-controlled H-2
Area in Hebron) and 208,000 in East Jerusalem – more than
double the number in 1993.24 Israel has invested roughly
€16 billion in the construction of the settlements, along with

21 Adam Hanieh and Catherine Cook, “Sharon’s Road Map”, MERIP, 1 June 2013,
available at http://www.merip.org/newspaper_opeds/oped060103-1; and Noam Sheizaf,
“This is Netanyahu’s final status solution”, 972 Magazine, available at https://972mag.
com/this-is-netanyahus-final-status-solution/94938/.
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Towards open-ended conflict

23 Orhan Niksic et al, “Area C and the Future of the Palestinian Economy”, World Bank, p.
4, available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/257131468140639464/AreaC-and-the-future-of-the-Palestinian-economy.
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transport infrastructure linking them back to Israel.25 The
settlements are not only connected to Israel by extensive
physical infrastructure, but robust legal infrastructure too.
Israelis who reside and do business in the occupied territory
are largely governed by Israeli law. In addition, the Knesset
has recently asserted authority to regulate even private
Palestinian land in the West Bank.
As ECFR’s “Two-State Stress Test” noted, each individual
settlement operates at a range of levels to impede resolution
of the conflict, representing:
“a community of Israeli citizens naturally tending to
be opposed to their eviction; a core of a multi-layered
security zone that affects Palestinians’ freedom of
movement, their housing, and their daily lives in a
radius far beyond the settlement’s physical boundaries;
a hub on a network, necessitating links with other
settlements and Israel proper through often segregated
roads, infrastructure, and military patrols; and it is a
progenitor of further points of settlement, with many
existing settlements throwing out extensions beyond
their original residential areas.”26
The growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank (including
East Jerusalem) and their gradual absorption into Israel
make it increasingly difficult for the Israeli government to
take steps to allow for the establishment of a viable and
contiguous Palestinian state. Were Israel to withdraw to the
Green Line (with, at most, minor and equal land exchanges)
in line with internationally endorsed parameters for
achieving a two-state solution, it would have to evacuate over
100,000 settlers and provide them with housing elsewhere.
If anything, political trends in Israel point in the opposite
direction, towards gradual formalisation of what has until
now been de facto annexation of West Bank territory.
This trajectory – towards outright (or de jure) annexation
− is reflected in the convergence of voices on both the right
and the left of Israeli politics in support of a “unilateral
separation” from the Palestinians. Recent plans put
forward by officials from the Labor, Likud, Yesh Atid, and
Bayit Yehudi parties are premised on the assumption that
there are no imminent prospects for achieving a two-state
solution, and that Israel should therefore act unilaterally
to shape realities on the ground in its favour to avoid sleepwalking into a one-state reality. While the percentage of
West Bank land to be annexed by Israel varies under each
plan, all would formalise Israel’s hold over large swathes
of the West Bank, and promote continued Palestinian
self-governance in Areas A and B under overriding Israeli
security control. Such steps also allow Israeli leaders to
defer any conversation on de-occupation until a later date.

22 Peter Hirschberg, “Blow to efforts to renew security cooperation, as Sharon outlines
contours of future settlement”, Haaretz, 14 April 2001, available at http://lists.mcgill.ca/
scripts/wa.exe?A2=ind0104b&L=fofognet&F=&S=&P=10080.

24 “Human rights situation in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East
Jerusalem”, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (U.N. doc. A/
HRC/34/38), March 2017, p. 4.

25 Shaul Arieli, Roby Nathanson, Ziv Rubin, and Hagar Tzameret-Kertcher, “Historical
Political and Economic Impact of Jewish Settlements in the Occupied Territories”, Israeli
European Policy Network, 2009, available at http://just250.net/iepn/images/stories/
papers/papershaularieli.pdf.
26 “Israel-Palestine: Two-State Stress Test”, European Council on Foreign Relations,
2013, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/mena/tsst.

Legal limbo for Palestinians

East Jerusalem; and,

Palestinians in the occupied territory are stuck in legal
limbo – denied both the rights possessed by citizens of Israel
and the protections guaranteed to them by international
humanitarian law as people living under occupation.

•

In tandem with the process of de facto annexing
Area C, Israel has imposed de jure a regime of systematised
discrimination across the occupied territory. In some
parts of the West Bank, Palestinians and Israeli settlers
live within metres of one another, yet the law grants them
markedly different rights and benefits.27

Palestinians may of course vote in PA elections if and when
they occur. This right, however, is of limited consequence
because the PA lacks effective sovereignty over Palestinian
territory. More importantly, the PA does not have authority
over Israel’s army, which controls salient aspects of the
lives of Palestinians throughout the occupied territory and
which frequently enters areas under Palestinian jurisdiction
(including Palestinian-controlled Area A) at will. It is
estimated that since the beginning of the occupation in 1967,
40 percent of the total male Palestinian population has
been detained under Israeli military orders.28 Israel decides
whether Palestinian residents of the occupied territory can
move across international borders and even, in the West
Bank, between cities. It also decides which goods reach
Palestinians and to what extent they can exploit their own
water and other natural resources, which international law
gives them permanent sovereignty over.

Contrast, for example, the situation of a Palestinian
residing in a village in Area C with a resident of a
neighbouring Israeli settlement:
•

The settler’s house cannot lawfully be searched
without a warrant, but any Israeli officer or
authorised soldier may search the Palestinian’s
without a warrant;

•

The Israeli settler is subject to Israeli criminal law
and, if arrested, would stand trial before a court
in Israel. If arrested after an altercation with an
Israeli, the Palestinian would stand trial in an
Israeli military court under military law instead,
which offers few procedural safeguards;

•

While the Israeli settler must be brought before
a judge within 24 hours of being arrested, the
Palestinian must sometimes wait up to 96 hours;

•

The settler may stage a demonstration involving up
to 50 persons without a permit, but the Palestinian
must obtain a permit if more than ten are involved;

•

The settler has a right to make their voice heard
in town/land planning processes that affect his
property or livelihood, but the Palestinian lacks any
access to those communication channels and for
decades has had no opportunity to seek alteration of
their village’s planning documents;

•

If the Israeli settler, under the recently passed
“Regularisation Law”, builds illegally on land
privately owned by Palestinians, the land may
be appropriated by military authorities and
allocated to that person. The Palestinian has no
such right and their property is likely to face
demolition for this infringement;

•

The Israeli settler may lawfully enter Jerusalem to
receive medical care, worship at holy sites, or simply
go shopping any time they like, but the Palestinian is
required to apply for a permit to enter even occupied

27 “One Rule, Two Legal Systems: Israel’s Regime of Laws in the West Bank”, Association
for Civil Rights in Israel, 1 August 2012, available at http://www.acri.org.il/en/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Two-Systems-of-Law-English-FINAL.pdf.

While the Israeli settler is able to vote in elections
that determine who will represent them in the
Knesset – and possess the authority to make or
change these rules – the Palestinian is not.

Although international law does not oblige an occupying
power to allow the population of the occupied territory to
vote in their national elections, it clearly prohibits them from
settling their own citizens in that territory, and establishing
a legal regime that privileges its own citizens over the local
population. Similarly, while international law allows an
occupying power considerable latitude with respect to how an
occupied territory is administered for the benefit of the local
population and what civil and political rights the territory's
residents enjoy, that latitude is premised on the temporary
character of occupation and scrupulous adherence to the
protections afforded by humanitarian law.29
The stark inequalities between Israelis and Palestinians are
compounded by the restrictions placed on the movement of
Palestinian persons and goods. In a territory about half the
size of Cyprus, Palestinians live under an array of different
legal regimes. In the West Bank, the territory is divided not
only into Areas A, B, and C, but also into enclaves in which
special restrictions apply: East Jerusalem neighbourhoods
inside the wall and outside the wall are subject to different
rules, for example, and special restrictions also apply in
the Jordan Valley and in seam zones along the border with
Israel, as well as for nature reserves and military firing zones.
In addition, pursuant to the “separation policy” Israel has
imposed, Palestinian residents of the Gaza Strip are barred
entirely from travelling to the West Bank, and vice versa,
with only a few exceptions.30 Because of the blockade, which
is enforced by Israel and Egypt, Palestinian residents of the
28 “Palestinian Political Prisoners in Israeli Prisons”, Addameer, January 2014, available
at
http://www.addameer.org/files/Palestinian%20Political%20Prisoners%20in%20
Israeli%20Prisons%20(General%20Briefing%20January%202014).pdf.
29 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”.
30 "Separating land, separating people", Gisha, June 2015, pp. 4-6, available at http://
gisha.org/publication/4379.
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Gaza Strip are also subject to sweeping restrictions on the
movement of goods – both into and out of the Strip from the
West Bank and global markets. Such measures isolate the
Gaza Strip (and its 1.9 million inhabitants) from the rest of
the OPT, and arguably facilitate Israel’s annexation of West
Bank territory by minimising access to the territory for the
many Palestinians living in Gaza.
The regime imposed on the OPT upends Israel’s
commitment outlined in the Oslo Accords (and under
international humanitarian law) not to alter the status or
integrity of the territory pending a final peace agreement.
Israeli practices also exacerbate divisions and inequalities
among Palestinians, undermining their capacity to realise
their right to self-determination as a people.
The international community has repeatedly affirmed that
the Palestinian people have the right to self-determination,
as well as the protections afforded by the law of occupation.
Palestinian residents of the occupied territory instead find
themselves stuck in legal limbo – enjoying neither the
rights assured to protected persons by the law of occupation
nor those accorded to citizens of a sovereign state under
human rights law. The result has been “the maintenance
of a systematic practice of racial discrimination in the
occupied territory” which can only be resolved by bringing
an end to the occupation.31

The future of the Palestinian liberation
movement

ECFR/226

July 2017

www.ecfr.eu

For now, the two-state solution remains the preference of
the PLO and a plurality of the Palestinian public.32 Even
Hamas has indicated its willingness to accept a Palestinian
state based on the pre-June 1967 borders. 33 However,
polling suggests that growing scepticism over the prospects
of a diplomatic breakthrough has translated into growing
Palestinian support for a one-state solution (OSS) through
which “Palestinians and Jews will be citizens of the same
state and enjoy equal rights”.34

8

Without tangible progress towards de-occupation, and
with prospects for independence rapidly evaporating, it
would be wrong to assume that the Palestinian liberation
strategy will forever remain predicated on blind faith in the
two-state solution and the Oslo peace process. Palestinian
leaders can only sell their domestic audiences the idea of
self-governance predicated on a tantalising yet alwaysout-of-reach independent state for so long, and it is worth
recalling that the Palestinian liberation movement predates the idea of a two-state solution.

31 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”, pp.9-10.
32 See poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 16 February 2017,
available at http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/678.
33 For analysis of Hamas’ policy positions towards Israel and the two-state solution,
see: Hugh Lovatt, “Time to bring Hamas in from the cold”, Middle East Eye, 3 May
2017, available at
http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/time-bring-hamascold-1168619508.
34 See poll by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research, 16 February 2017,
available at http://www.pcpsr.org/en/node/678.

The continued absence of any real prospects for ending the
occupation will inevitably impact on Palestinian strategic
calculations, which for now remain focused overwhelmingly
on diplomatic engagement, multilateralism, and arguments
in international law. The belief that sovereignty through
diplomacy is untenable is leading to growing popular
support for alternative Palestinian liberation strategies for
ending the occupation. The Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions
(BDS) movement is a prominent example of this trend.
Less certain is the shape of a future Palestinian strategy –
even more so given the real possibility of a succession crisis
within the Palestinian leadership. A post-Mahmoud Abbas
Palestinian liberation strategy could place greater emphasis
on grassroots rights-based mobilisation within the current
two-state paradigm, or pivot towards a call for equal rights
for all “between the river and the sea”, directly challenging
the premises of Zionism as the movement for Jewish selfdetermination in Israel. Alternatively, what emerges could
be greater public support for a return to armed resistance to
the occupation, or the ascendancy of the nihilistic violence
currently perpetrated by Palestinians in Israel and the OPT.
Or it could be a mixture of all these things.
Europe has dismissed frequent threats by President Mahmoud
Abbas to tear up the Oslo Accords, hand the keys of the PA to
Israel, or walk away from security cooperation entirely. But
the international community has paid little attention to what
will come after the 82-year-old leader’s inevitable departure,
nor has it done anything to help lay the groundwork for a
smooth leadership transition that could provide renewed
legitimacy for peace-making efforts.
Whatever the direction, a new and unstable reality is likely to
emerge in the wake of Abbas’s departure. The new reality will
likely be combined with steady fragmentation of the Palestinian
national movement and seemingly inevitable Israeli military
operations in Gaza – not to mention the ever-present risk of
regional spill-over. Such a situation could create far harder
political and moral choices for Israel and its friends in the
international community than those faced today.

Holding the line: the contours of a new
European strategy
While a two-state solution remains the preferred outcome
for resolving the conflict, the diplomatic path leading to such
an end-game has been steadily eroded by developments on
the ground. In theory, Israel’s creeping annexation remains
reversible. However, every new settlement unit increases the
political and financial cost of achieving peace. In addition,
Israel’s steady assault on Palestinian national institutions
may eventually turn claims that it lacks a Palestinian
partner into a self-fulfilling prophecy, producing an even
more fragmented political reality and a far less manageable
security situation than we see today.
Given the unlikeliness of any move towards de-occupation
coming from within Israel, concerted international

engagement is crucial. But with the best of intentions,
Europe has prioritised peace negotiations within the Oslo
framework over all else – including efforts to end the
occupation. In so doing, it has created a perverse incentive
structure that has helped to entrench the occupation and
Israelis’ support for it. Tinkering at the margins will not
therefore alter the dangerous trajectory the two sides are
on. Nor can providing palliative care to Palestinians ensure
long-term stability in the OPT.
Current US attempts to get both parties to resume
negotiations make it tempting for Europe to step back
and cheerlead American efforts. But if Europe is firm in
its conviction that preserving the possibility of a twostate solution is a strategic and moral imperative, it must
be prepared to hold the line against efforts by Israel to
irrevocably change the political geography and demographic
character of the OPT. The EU should stop reinforcing the
status quo and work to bring about positive change on the
ground. It must also act with renewed self-confidence and
exhibit greater willingness to work independently from the
Trump administration.
A simple litmus test for EU policy should be whether it either
supports Palestinian sovereignty and moves Israel towards
de-occupation, or sustains Israel’s prolonged occupation.
Europe will not only need to ensure that its policies in Israel/
Palestine are consistent with obligations arising from its
domestic legal order in accordance with the legal obligation
of all states to bring the occupation of Palestine to an end.

differentiation practices.35 To their credit, the European
Commission and European External Action Service have
made incremental progress in this regard. They can also
take credit for supporting a legal requirement that has
contributed towards the preservation of the two-state
solution. To be effective, however, there needs to be
commensurate participation by EU member states at the
level of their bilateral relations with Israel.
ECFR’s previous reports on EU differentiation have outlined
a number of steps that EU member states should consider,
but it is worth once again recalling some of the main
recommendations. EU member states should:
1.

Identify areas in their bilateral relations with
Israel where EU and national law is deficiently
implemented by conducting a review of existing
agreements with Israel to ensure these effectively
exclude all settlement-based entities and activities.

2.

Adopt their own national guidelines prohibiting the
disbursement of public funds to Israeli settlementlinked entities or activities, modelled on the practices
already put in place by the EU and Germany.

3.

Ensure that their citizens and businesses act in full
accordance with domestic and international law in
their dealings with Israeli settlement entities, and
implement business guidance through domestic
regulatory measures. 36 Similarly, member states
should actively engage with businesses established
under their national jurisdiction to ensure they are
fully aware of the legal status of the OPT, and the legal
risks that arise from their economic and financial
activities in, and in relation to, the settlements, given
the fact that they are built on unlawfully appropriated
land in occupied territory that is not recognised as
part of Israel’s territory.37

4.

Encourage the European Commission to inform EU
nationals operating and/or investing in settlementlinked entities of the risks entailed by such activities,
building on the common messaging adopted by
some 18 member states; as well as on the recent
answer given by Vice-President Federica Mogherini
on behalf of the Commission relating to financial
transactions between EU-based financial institutions
and those based in Israel linked to settlement entities
or activities.38

Consolidating EU differentiation
The time has come for European states to lead a strategy
that harnesses the normative framework of international
law in support of foreign policy objectives. The starting point
for such efforts remains the necessity of shielding the EU’s
domestic legal order from Israel’s internationally unlawful
practices. Given the EU’s positions and commitments on the
status and consequences of Israeli actions in international
law, it must not allow its actions to confer recognition of
Israeli sovereignty over the OPT or give effect to Israel’s
internationally unlawful acts.
Ensuring the proper functioning of European law in this
way can also serve to alter Israel’s incentive structure and,
thereby, feed a national debate about priorities among
Israelis. To the extent that Israeli institutions and projects
are required to exclude settlement entities to qualify for
grants, participate in programmes, or otherwise deepen
relations with the EU, Israelis will be better placed to
internalise the costs of the settlement enterprise. Israelis
should understand that there is a choice to be made between
broadening and enhancing relations with the EU − its
leading trading partner − and maintaining an occupation
that defies fundamental norms of international law.
Such an effort would build on and reaffirm the EU’s existing

35 For an overview of EU and EU member state measures to differentiate between Israel
and the settlements, see ECFR’s work on the topic: Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully
prolonged occupation”, pp.11-13; Hugh Lovatt, “EU differentiation and the push for peace
in Israel-Palestine”; Hugh Lovatt and Mattia Toaldo, “EU differentiation and Israeli
settlements”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 22 July 2015, available at http://
www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/eu_differentiation_and_israeli_settlements3076.
36 A list of countries that have so far issued such business advisories can be found here:
Hugh Lovatt, “EU member state business advisories on Israeli settlements”, European
Council on Foreign Relations, 2 November 2016, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/article/
eu_member_state_business_advisories_on_israel_settlements.
37 For more information about how Europe funds Israeli settlements see: Hugh Lovatt,
“EU differentiation and the push for peace in Israel-Palestine”.
38 See: “Answer given by Vice-President Mogherini on behalf of the Commission”,
European Parliament, 13 June 2017, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/
getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2017-002582&language=EN.
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Deepening and broadening differentiation:
UNSCR 2334

also allows Israelis and Palestinians to more easily dismiss
the EU as a political player.

European states have played an important role in broadening
the process of differentiation outside of Europe. EU members
of the UN Security Council supported Resolution 2334 in
December 2016 which, in paragraph 5, calls on all states “to
distinguish, in their relevant dealings, between the territory
of the State of Israel and the territories occupied since
1967”.39 This clause builds on the EU’s own differentiation
practice, echoing language found in its own Foreign Affairs
Council (FAC) Conclusions and statements.40

Europe cannot impose a peace settlement, but it can
continue to defend the possibility of a two-state solution and
create the conditions for future negotiations. To that end,
EU policy should use international law as its guiding star.

In March 2017, five EU members of the UN Human Rights
Council – with the support of an additional four EU member
states not currently members of the UNHRC – also helped
pass a resolution on Israeli settlements containing some of
the strongest differentiation language to date.41 It not only
echoed the UN Security Council’s call for member states
to implement a territorial distinction between Israel and
the OPT, but also emphasised “the importance for States
to act in accordance with their own national legislation on
promoting compliance with international humanitarian
law with regard to business activities that result in human
rights abuses”, such as those that result from Israeli
practices in the OPT.42
As by far the most advanced actor on this front, the EU and its
member states can encourage other states to implement clause
5 of UNSCR 2334 by drawing attention to efforts that it and
other third parties (such as the US and China) have undertaken
to insulate their relations with Israel from its settlement
activities.43 Taken together, these pre-existing differentiation
measures can act as a guide for others interested in ensuring
that their relations with Israel are conducted in accordance
with international law and UNSCR 2334.

www.ecfr.eu

Instilling and demanding clarity
By shielding Israel from accountability, third states have
not only enabled the continuation of its unlawful practices,
but also undermined the very instruments that were meant
to prevent such a situation from arising in the first place.
Protecting any state from the legal consequences of its
actions undermines the functioning of the international
legal order to the detriment of all. Apparent backtracking on
consensus positions and commitments towards the conflict
39 “United Nations Security Council Resolution 2334”, UN Security Council, 23 December
2016, available at http://www.un.org/webcast/pdfs/SRES2334-2016.pdf.
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40 For a detailed overview of relevant EU FAC language see Hugh Lovatt, “EU
differentiation and the push for peace in Israel-Palestine”, p.6.
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41 The five EU member states voting in favour of the resolution were: Belgium, Germany,
the Netherlands, Portugal, and Slovenia (in addition to non-EU member Switzerland). The
resolution received the external support of four EU member states not currently sitting
on the UNHRC: Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Malta. (ECFR correspondence with
UNHRC delegation member).

Unilateral attempts to obscure, or change outright, the
legal status of the OPT must continue to be met with
firm and consistent reaffirmation of the long-established
normative framework for managing and resolving armed
conflicts in international law.44 That framework has three
pillars: the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory
by force and of the illegal use of force to maintain a
situation of occupation for that purpose (jus ad bellum);
the law of belligerent occupation under international
humanitarian law (jus in bello); and the law governing
the self-determination of peoples.
In tandem with a clear articulation and defence of its own
position, the EU must continue tirelessly demanding that
Israel clearly align its own positions with the longstanding and
universal international consensus over the legal framework
applicable to its actions, no matter how futile or awkward
such démarches may seem in the current political climate. It
must also continue to hold fast to internationally supported
parameters for resolving the conflict – as articulated by the
EU itself in its July 2014 FAC Conclusions.45
In recent years, the Netanyahu government has managed to
have its cake and eat it too. On the one hand, it has placated
constituencies on the far-right by implementing the
recommendations of the 2012 Levy Committee report on the
legal status of building in the West Bank – including that the
laws of occupation do not apply in the West Bank – without
formally adopting its conclusions.46 On the other hand, it
has placated members of the international community by
expressing nominal support for a two-state solution, albeit
with so many caveats that it is difficult to discern what it
means by the phrase.
It bears recalling that demanding clarity from the parties
to this conflict is far from unprecedented. Over the last
three decades, the international community has insisted
that Palestinian leaders unequivocally embrace UNSC
Resolution 242 (and its land for peace formula), that
they recognise Israel, revise the PLO Charter, and accept
the “Quartet Principles”, making compliance with these
demands conditions for diplomatic engagement and
international assistance.

42 Human Rights Council Resolution, Israeli settlements in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, including East Jerusalem, and in the occupied Syrian Golan, UN Doc HRC/
A/34/L.41, 21 March 2017, available at https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0
/4130476E4C2172CF852580EC00510FA3.

44 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”.

43 China has sought to ensure that its workers are not employed in Israeli settlements
as part of a bilateral agreement with Israel signed in April 2017. For an overview of
US “differentiation” measures, see “What is EU Differentiation?”, European Council
on Foreign Relations, 31 October 2016, available at http://www.ecfr.eu/article/eu_
differentiation_faq#q2.

46 “From Occupation to Annexation: the silent adoption of the Levy report on retroactive
authorization of illegal construction in the West Bank”, Yesh Din, 2 February 2016,
available at https://www.yesh-din.org/en/from-occupation-to-annexation-the-silentadoption-of-the-levy-report-on-retroactive-authorization-of-illegal-construction-in-thewest-bank/.

45 “European Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process”, Council of the
European Union, 22 July 2014, available at www.consilium.europa.eu/en/workarea/
downloadasset.aspx?id=27404.

Similarly, Israel must be pressed – firmly and consistently
– to explicitly disavow the Levy report’s conclusions
regarding the status of the OPT and the inapplicability
of international humanitarian law. Israel must also be
called upon to recognise the Palestinians’ right to selfdetermination in a contiguous state based on the 1967
Green Line, and agree to clear terms of reference for future
negotiations.		

Consolidating the normative foundation for
further action
The notion that a parallel process in the UN or in regional
bodies to elaborate on third states’ obligations somehow
adversely affects conflict resolution ignores the very
raison d’être of these international mechanisms. In fact,
processes such as differentiation can support conflict
resolution efforts because “States are expected to adopt
and further determinations by international institutions
commensurate with the gravity of the [occupier’s]
conduct.” 47 The EU and its member states should also
acknowledge the broader stake they have in defending a
rules-based international order.
A new European policy will be most effective (and more
politically acceptable) if it is built upon a thoroughly
elaborated normative foundation and within wellestablished institutional frameworks. The applicability
of international humanitarian and human rights law to
the OPT – and Israel’s violation of these norms – is well
established. However, more needs to be done to determine
and enforce the consequences of Israel’s violation of the
jus ad bellum.
Although the UN Security Council represents one avenue
for taking action of this kind, its permanent members are
unlikely, for political reasons, to allow such measures to
pass. Nor are they likely to impose sanctions against
Israel should its practices be deemed to constitute acts of
aggression or a threat to international peace and security.

Revisiting Oslo: From capacity building to
sovereignty building?
Given the extent to which the Oslo Accords impact on
almost every facet of Palestinians’ daily lives, including their
interactions with Israel and the outside world, tearing them
up completely is neither feasible nor desirable. But following
a quarter-century of failed diplomacy choreographed by the
Accords, it would be similarly imprudent to see them as
sacrosanct or immutable.
There is a question about whether the jurisdictional
scheme devised in Oslo, as applied over a period five times
longer than initially envisaged and often interpreted in
bad faith, is fundamentally at odds with international
humanitarian law and the protection of Palestinians’ right
to self-determination. Instead of debating whether the PA
should or should not exist, donor focus should shift to
how Palestinian public institutions can be unshackled
from the jurisdictional restraints and broader restrictions
imposed through the Oslo Accords that make further state
building impossible.
In addition, the framework for assistance should be revisited
by international donors. As the prospects for a peace
settlement grow increasingly remote, the focus of donor
coordination efforts should shift from capacity building
to sovereignty building. Such a shift might involve three
complementary initiatives:
1.

The EU should explore how aid can be used to
support Palestinian economic independence. This
might include support for Palestinian accession to
the World Trade Organization and revisions to the
Paris Protocol, which has contributed to stunting the
Palestinian economy in the West Bank.

2.

Donor coordination mechanisms should be
reconfigured to facilitate a concerted effort to
address the primary challenge to Palestinian
sovereignty: restrictions on movement and access
– particularly in Area C. Too often donors focus on
what Palestinians should do and not what Israel
is obliged to do. This dynamic needs to change.
Promoting greater Palestinian access to, and control
over, their natural resources in Area C (in line with
the recommendations made by the Quartet in their
July 2016 report)49 could help bolster the Palestinian
presence there amid Israeli efforts to displace the
local population through a concerted policy that
results in socioeconomic suffocation.

3.

Drawing on the legal obligations of an occupier
under international humanitarian law to provide for
the basic needs of citizens living under occupation,
international donors should consider seeking a
contribution from Israel for the cost of providing
services to the Palestinian population of the West

The UN General Assembly, however, could exercise its
own authority to recommend collective action. This could
include requesting an advisory opinion from the ICJ to
further clarify the legality of Israel’s continued presence
in the Palestinian territory and its effects on third state
responsibilities, as was done in relation to South Africa’s
presence in Namibia in 1971.48
In addition, the EU should make its own determination
of the consequences of Israel’s continued presence in
the Palestinian territory and EU responsibilities under
international law, especially in light of Israel’s illegal use
of force to maintain its control over the OPT (in violation
of jus ad bellum).

47 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”, p.9.
48 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”, p.9.

49 “Report of the Middle East Quartet”, July 2016, available at http://www.un.org/News/
dh/infocus/middle_east/Report-of-the-Middle-East-Quartet.pdf.
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Bank and Gaza Strip, until the occupation is
successfully brought to an end.
In coordinating these efforts, donors, whether from the EU
or elsewhere, should be careful not to give effect to Israel’s
internationally unlawful acts. The EU itself should match its
financial efforts to alleviate the harms caused to Palestinians
by Israel’s unlawful practices (such as in Area C and the
Gaza Strip) with proportionate political and legal measures.
Action of this kind cannot be expected to prompt immediate
positive action by Israel, so a sustained effort will be
necessary. Such an approach, in any case, is far more likely
to produce constructive results over the long term than
continuation along the current trajectory is. The EU and its
member states should, however, bear in mind that only once
Israel’s occupation has been brought to an end can effective
state building be accomplished in Palestine.

Incentivising de-occupation, disincentivising
annexation
Ultimately, it will be the Israeli public that decides whether to
end the occupation, and the EU can only hope to encourage
action rather than force Israel’s hand. But a decision to
end the occupation will not come unless it is driven by far
more powerful incentives than those that have so far been
brought to bear. Responses to polling confirm, moreover,
that a combination of positive and negative incentives will
be necessary to create a shift in policy.50
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But the single-minded fixation on getting parties to the
negotiating table and keeping them there – even if no
real progress is possible – has made European states and
others reluctant to pursue measures that can successfully
challenge the increasingly entrenched reality in the OPT,
and chip away at Israeli public support for continued
occupation, settlement activity, and the violation of
Palestinian rights. While European governments have
offered Israel generous positive incentives contingent on
making steps towards de-occupation, they have largely
been reluctant to establish negative incentives for Israeli
violations of international norms.51
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As a result, Israel has found that integrating settlement
entities and activities into its political and economic fabric,
while maintaining an unlawfully prolonged occupation,
causes few problems, even in its bilateral relations with
third parties.
In contrast, the international community has been far more
willing to impose conditions and sanctions on Palestinians:
for example, the EU and US imposed financial sanctions on
the PA following the election of a Hamas-led government in
2006, and have repeatedly pressed Palestinian negotiators
to accept Israeli demands such as recognising Israel as a
50 Survey of Israeli public opinion by the Israeli Democracy Index commissioned by
ECFR, 30-31 March 2014.
51 For more on EU incentives and disincentives see: Hugh Lovatt, “EU differentiation and
the push for peace in Israel-Palestine”, pp. 2-3.

Jewish State, ending “incitement” as well as payments to
Palestinians involved in attacks on Israelis.
As one means of cooperating to bring the occupation to an
end, third states should work together to develop a coherent
and targeted programme of incentives conditional on the
fulfilment of tangible steps towards ending the occupation.
Those steps have been enumerated repeatedly by the
international community under international law, and
include:
•

Halting restrictions on Palestinian access to and
development of Area C and East Jerusalem;

•

Permitting Palestinian social and political
institutions in East Jerusalem to function;

•

Allowing free and normal movement of Palestinian
persons and goods across the OPT, including
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip; and,

•

Freezing the construction of settlements and related
infrastructure.

Softening or reformulating these demands in response
to Israeli intransigence is a tactic that has never resulted
in Israel complying with its obligations. Europe should
therefore attach consequences to Israel’s failure to do so.
EU member states could consider following the example set
by some 136 states – including Sweden – to recognise the
State of Palestine. This would be the ultimate expression of
support for the ailing two-state solution and go a small way
towards redressing the current asymmetry between the two
sides. Such a step need not prejudge the outcome of final
status negotiations in the future (including the possibility
of changes to the 1967 borders through equal land swaps).
There are several additional measures available to third
states that can help to ensure they do not give effect to
Israel’s unlawful practices in the OPT and that can lend
appropriate support to victims of such practices. The yearly
EU Heads of Mission reports on Jerusalem, and the EU’s
Maghreb-Mashreq Working Group, have already identified
some of these, such as:
•

Obtaining compensation from Israel for its
demolitions and confiscation of EU humanitarian
projects in Area C;

•

Reassessing the distribution of funds through the
European Neighbourhood Initiative (ENI), in line
with the “more for more, less for less” policy;

•

Slowing down the future development of bilateral
relations, including with regard to EU-Israel
twinning projects;

•

Strengthening financial and political support for legal
actions on public interest cases and legal assistance
to Palestinian residents facing confiscation,
demolition, and eviction orders; and,

•

Refusing visas to known violent settlers and those
calling for acts of violence.

Other measures could be modelled on the EU’s much more
forceful reaction to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and
Sevastopol in March 2014, and could include:
•

Prohibiting the import of Israeli products originating
in the settlements, as well European investments
in the settlements (meaning that no Europeans or
EU-based companies can buy real estate or entities
located in the settlements, finance settlement-based
companies, or supply related services);

•

Prohibiting EU-based companies from providing
tourism services in the settlements; and,

•

Imposing targeted sanctions upon persons and
entities providing support to or benefitting from
Israel’s unlawful practices in the OPT, including its
illegal annexation of Palestinian territory.52

Voices in Israel have already spoken about the consequences
of prolonged occupation. Former Israeli prime ministers
Ehud Barak and Ehud Olmert have both warned that Israel
faces either losing its Jewish majority or apartheid, should it
fail to make peace with the Palestinians.53 Israeli intelligence
chiefs have echoed the same warnings, such as the former
head of Mossad Tamir Pardo who argued that the future
prospect of a binational state is the only existential threat
facing Israel.54
Similarly, President Barack Obama and Secretary of State
John Kerry justified US engagement based on the same
concerns, with the former US president warning that “today,
Israel is at a crossroads…Given the demographics west of the
Jordan River, the only way for Israel to endure and thrive as
a Jewish and democratic state is through the realization of
an independent and viable Palestine”.55 In his last speech
before leaving office, Kerry elaborated further, noting that
the US “cannot properly defend and protect Israel − if we
allow a viable two state solution to be destroyed before our
eyes…That’s what we were standing up for: Israel’s future as
a Jewish and democratic state”.56
In view of the above, the EU and its member states should
develop and adopt the following common messaging:
1.

Ultimately, it is for Palestinians to decide for themselves
which path to self-determination to pursue – a point
that bears emphasis as we mark 100 years of the Balfour
Declaration. There continue to be good reasons for the EU,
and the international community, to support a two-state
solution – not least because it remains the preference for
most Israelis and Palestinians. However, the EU can no
longer avoid considering how it would respond to alternative
futures in view of the emerging reality on the ground.

Rejection of a situation that formalises
discrimination against Palestinians. Israeli
leaders are using the diplomatic vacuum caused
by the absence of meaningful peace talks to deny
Palestinian statehood while working to formalise
Israel’s annexation of large settlement blocs in the
West Bank. Such dynamics will contribute to the
simmering instability in the Palestinian territories,
weaken the PA, and create what EU High
Representative Federica Mogherini has referred to
as a “one-state reality of unequal rights”. European
officials should start talking about Israel’s de
facto annexation of West Bank territory and its
maintenance of a bifurcated legal system in the
OPT that privileges the rights of Israeli settlers over
those of Palestinians.57

2.

Beginning a European discussion about alternatives does
not constitute a repudiation of the two-state solution,
nor would a shift away from a two-state solution alter
Israel’s responsibilities under the law of occupation. But a
conversation of this kind could help sharpen European and
Israeli minds as to the inescapable implications of current
policy trajectories.

Clearly state opposition to Israel’s openended occupation. European officials must clearly
speak out against Israeli efforts to entrench a reality
in which Israelis benefit from greater rights than
Palestinians. They should also oppose attempts by
Israel (and President Abbas’s PA) to isolate and
decouple the Gaza Strip from the rest of the OPT,

53 Rory McCarthy, “Barak: make peace with Palestinians or face apartheid”, the Guardian,
3 February 2010, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/03/barakapartheid-palestine-peace; “Olmert Blasts Netanyahu's Foreign Policy, Warns of Risk
of Apartheid in Israel”, Haaretz, 2 October 2015, available at http://www.haaretz.com/
israel-news/1.678606.

The EU and its member states will no doubt find many of the
above measures politically unpalatable, and there is little
chance of achieving the necessary consensus to implement
most of them at present. But such recommendations
illustrate how much more the EU can do – and indeed
has done in other contexts when it mustered the political
willingness. They also demonstrate that ‘differentiation’
measures represent an exceptionally modest step given the
seriousness of the situation on the ground.

Acknowledging future realities

52 For more details on EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis see “EU sanctions
against Russia over Ukraine crisis”, Europa.eu, available at https://europa.eu/newsroom/
highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en.

54 Gili Cohen, “Ex-Mossad Chief Says Occupation Is Israel's Only Existential Threat”,
Haaretz, 22 March 2017, available at http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.778650.
55 “Remarks of President Barack Obama To the People of Israel”, Obama White House
Archives, 21 March 2013, available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/03/21/remarks-president-barack-obama-people-israel.
56 “Kerry Blasts Israeli Government, Presents Six Points of Future Peace Deal”, Haaretz,
28 December 2016, available at http://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/1.761881.
57 Valentina Azarova, “Israel’s unlawfully prolonged occupation”, p.10.
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and stress the need for the reactivation of Palestinian
governance structures.
3.

Frame the consequences of a one-state
solution. If the will-power or ability to achieve
a two-state solution no longer exists, then the EU
should be explicit in its indication that the only
acceptable alternative is the extension by Israel of
equal rights to all residents of the OPT. Raising such
a prospect would help Israelis internalise the fact
that undermining the potential for a Palestinian
state jeopardises Israel’s future as a democracy with
a Jewish majority.

4.

Align European positions on the
consequences of Israel’s violations of jus
ad bellum with international law. In such a
situation, third states must cooperate to bring to an
end Israel's unlawfully prolonged occupation, and
return full and effective control of the territory to the
Palestinian sovereign. In addition, the EU should
actively work to disincentivise Israel’s perpetuation
of this situation through the illegal acquisition
of Palestinian territory and the establishment
of a system of racial discrimination by holding it
accountable for its actions under international law.

5.

Maintain Israel’s obligations as an occupying
power. The absence of tangible progress towards a
two-state solution may lead Palestinians to demand
equal rights within a binational state, including
potentially through a stepped-up civil rights
campaign. However, pending a final agreement
between Israel and the PLO and a formal end
of conflict, the EU should continue to treat the
Palestinian territories (East Jerusalem, Gaza, and
the West Bank) as occupied territory in line with
the applicable international law, including through
continued differentiation measures to ensure full
and effective non-recognition of Israeli settlement
entities and activities. The EU should also continue
to promote adherence by Israel to its obligations
as an occupying power under the Fourth Geneva
Convention and other applicable international law
so long as there is no formal end to the conflict.
Removing the protections afforded to Palestinians
under the law of occupation and relieving Israel of
its responsibilities as an occupying power before the
end of conflict would otherwise risk accelerating an
outcome in which a Jewish minority enjoys vastly
superior rights to a Palestinian majority.

About the authors

Acknowledgements

Omar Dajani is professor of law and co-director of the
Global Center at the University of the Pacific, McGeorge
School of Law, in Sacramento, California. Previously, he
served as legal adviser to the Palestinian negotiating team
in peace talks with Israel (1999-2001) and as a political
officer in the Office of the UN Special Coordinator for the
Middle East Peace Process (UNSCO). Since that time he
has continued to work as a consultant on a variety of legal
infrastructure development and conflict resolution projects
in the Middle East and elsewhere. He received his J.D. from
Yale Law School and his B.A. from Northwestern University.

The authors would like to thank the many experts and
policymakers who generously gave their time to inform the
ideas and recommendations presented in this report. We
would also like to thank the team at ECFR for their help, in
particular, our editor Gareth Davies, and MENA programme
director Ruth Citrin. Finally, we owe a special debt of
gratitude to Sari Bashi for her extensive feedback regarding
earlier drafts of this report, and to Dr Valentina Azarova
whose June 2017 report for ECFR on “Israel’s unlawfully
prolonged occupation” provided a valuable legal foundation
for our work. It goes without saying that any mistakes or
omissions are ours alone.

Hugh Lovatt is policy fellow and Israel/Palestine project
coordinator for ECFR's Middle East and North Africa
Programme. During his time at ECFR, he has worked
extensively to advance the concept of “EU differentiation”,
which was enshrined in UN Security Council Resolution
2334 (December 2016). Prior to his he worked as a
researcher for International Crisis Group and as a Schuman
Fellow in the European Parliament focusing on Middle East
policy. His most recent publication is “EU differentiation
and the push for peace in Israel-Palestine” (October 2016).

15

RETHINKING OSLO: HOW EUROPE CAN PROMOTE PEACE IN ISRAEL-PALESTINE

ABOUT ECFR
The European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) is the first
pan-European think-tank. Launched in 2007, its objective is to
conduct cutting-edge research, build coalitions for change, and
promote informed debate on the development of coherent,
effective and values-based European foreign policy.
ECFR has developed a strategy with three distinctive elements
that define its activities:
•A pan-European Council. ECFR has brought together a
distinguished Council of over 250 members – politicians,
decision makers, thinkers and business people from the EU’s
member states and candidate countries – which meets once
a year. Through regular geographical and thematic task
forces, members provide ECFR staff with advice and feedback
on policy ideas and help with ECFR’s activities in their own
countries. The Council is chaired by Carl Bildt, Emma Bonino
and Mabel van Oranje.
•A
 physical presence in the main EU member states.
Uniquely among European think-tanks, ECFR has offices
in Berlin, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, Sofia and Warsaw,
allowing the organisation to channel the opinions and
perspectives of a wide range of EU member states. Our panEuropean presence puts us at the centre of policy debates
in European capitals, and provides a platform for research,
debate, advocacy and communications.
•D
 eveloping contagious ideas that get people talking.
ECFR has brought together a team of distinguished
researchers and practitioners from all over Europe to carry
out innovative research and policy development projects
with a pan-European focus. ECFR produces original research;
publishes policy reports; hosts private meetings, public
debates, and “friends of ECFR” gatherings in EU capitals; and
reaches out to strategic media outlets.
ECFR is a registered charity funded by charitable foundations,
national governments, companies and private individuals.
These donors allow us to publish our ideas and advocate for a
values-based EU foreign policy. ECFR works in partnership with
other think-tanks and organisations but does not make grants
to individuals or institutions.

The European Council on Foreign
Relations does not take collective
positions. This paper, like all publications
of the European Council on Foreign
Relations, represents only the views of
its authors.
Copyright of this publication is held
by the European Council on Foreign
Relations. You may not copy, reproduce,
republish or circulate in any way the
content from this publication except for
your own personal and non-commercial
use. Any other use requires the prior
written permission of the European
Council on Foreign Relations
© ECFR July 2017
ISBN: 978-1-911544-26-5
Published by the European Council
on Foreign Relations (ECFR),
7th Floor, Kings Buildings,
16 Smith Square, London,
SW1p 3HQ, United Kingdom
london@ecfr.eu

Design by David Carroll & Co davidcarrollandco.com

ECFR/226

July 2017

www.ecfr.eu

www.ecfr.eu

